Abstract.-For most of Latin America the 1970s were a decade of growth, though with political upheaval in Argentina and Chile. The 1980s were a disaster. The 1990s have seen economic reform, liberalization, a return to democracy and financial turmoil. This study attempts to explain the three decades as one piece, through an analysis of the evolution of earnings inequality from year to year in eight major Latin American countries and one Caribbean nation. We find that changes in earnings inequality are a sensitive indicator of slump, repression, political turmoil, civil war, natural disaster and --on the positive side --occasional periods of growth and stability in Latin America. Indeed almost the whole recent history of Latin America can be summarized in the movement of industrial inequality statistics.
Introduction
This essay is about the relationship between industrial earnings inequality and the political history of Latin America. First, we offer a word on the data and method used to construct a measure of the movement of industrial earnings inequality for each of the countries under study.
Second, we investigate the relationship between political regimes and changes in earnings inequality for each of the countries, including orthodox and heterodox stabilizations and the transition from closed to open trading systems. The third section will inquire into the relationship between economic growth and our measurement of inequality and the grading report card for each of the regimes of the countries studied. Conclusions stressing policy implications complete the essay.
Data and Methods
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL) maintains a detailed industrial data set on the major Latin American economies, including total payrolls and employment for 28 industrial sectors for each year from 1970 to 1995. (See Table 1 ). Wages in each case are expressed in constant 1985 US dollars.
The countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, along with incomplete data for Costa Rica which we did not use. In addition, we have data for Venezuela from a separate data source, the Industrial Statistics database of the United Nations International Development Organization (UNIDO). Together the countries represented include 394 million people, that is 85% of the region's population and 91.2% of the region's total GDP between 1970 and 1994. Our measurement of the change in earnings inequality within each country is the change in the between-group component of the group-wise decomposition of the Theil statistic (Theil, 1972;  see Conceicao and Galbraith 1998 for details). Typically, this is based on a decomposition of average earnings per employee into 28 industrial groupings.
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The between-group component of Theil measures, in essence, the dispersion of the weighted means of 28 mutually exclusive groups of workers in each country. Since these groups cover nearly the whole of manufacturing employment, it follows that the movement of this statistic through time must reflect the changing dispersion of earnings in the manufacturing population taken as a whole. In this way, computations of T´ usefully augment traditional sources of information about earnings inequality, particularly those generated by the common theoretical base of household expenditures surveys to produce time specific Gini coefficients. 2 The results are shown in Figures 1, 2, 2a and 2b.
Figures 1 and 2 about here.
Political Regimes and the Evolution of Earnings Inequality in Latin America
In this section we review the political regimes in each country and the major political and policy turning points, in conjunction with changes in the dispersion of industrial earnings.
Argentina
Argentina is characterized by large increases in inequality during the past 25 years, alternating Inequality, however, remained high as Pinochet ceded power to the Christian Democrats in 1990.
As in Argentina, the transition to civilian rule brought with it a reduction in inequality, but only briefly, and never close to restoring the egalitarian earnings structures of the period before the military coup.
Colombia
Our measure of inequality for Colombia reveals the most stable behavior of wage dispersion in our sample. This is perhaps not surprising: Colombia has pursued stable and successful policies almost continuously through this period, and has enjoyed comparative political stability as well despite its ongoing civil war. Colombia has been the only Latin American country that has repeatedly showed positive real GDP growth during the entire period of this study. Doubtless, the fact that Colombia relies almost entirely on primary sector products for export earnings has also helped maintain relative equality of industrial earnings; the industrial sector is small and there has never been a question of export-led industrialization in Colombia.
Jamaica
The data allow us to compute an inequality measurement for only one Caribbean country, Despite success in the political arena, problems for Seaga began to mount soon after he was elected for a second term. In 1985 they became unmanageable, and strong measures were taken to reduce and rationalize government expenditures. As the economy worsened, we observe a dramatic increase in inequality of the wage structure. Further evidence on the Salinas administration can be found in Calmon et al. (forthcoming) , who use another data set that covered the period from 1968-1998. They show that Mexican inequality rose sharply in 1995 as the peso collapsed once again.
Peru
Peru illustrates the extreme case of how economic and political upheaval can raise inequality in the wage structure. Peru displayed a stable trend of inequality during the two military regimes in the 1970s. In 1981, after President Fernando Belaunde Terry returned the government to civilian rule, inequality began a meteoric rise, which continued until President Alan Garcia briefly but unsuccessfully tried to force it back down. There followed an economic and political explosion, leading to the Fujimori administration under which inequality, after first declining somewhat, has once again begun to increase. In 1985, a young and charismatic opposition candidate, Alan Garcia Perez, was elected president. Populism came into power with him. Garcia's main policy was to reduce inflation through an expansion of aggregate demand. He launched a stabilization program, the Inti Plan, changed the currency to the Inti from the devalued sol, and introduced a multiple exchange rate with nine different rates, while tightening control of financial intermediaries. Our measurement of inequality shows an sharp decrease for 1986 and a small reduction in the next year. In 1987, the President announced two striking plans: a) that Peru would pay no more than 10 percent of its export earnings toward a nearly $14 billion foreign debt b) a law to nationalize commercial banks, completing public control of the financial system. As economic activities contracted and GDP fell dramatically in 1988, the Inti Plan failed to control inflation, confidence to the president collapsed. A huge increase in inequality came in 1989 and 1990.
Alberto Fujimori was elected president in 1990. He began a difficult set of policies to regain domestic and international confidence. The most salient was the start of strong liberalization policies.
Exports began to recover by the end of 1990, led by the primary sector. Oil exports grew as Petroperu was partially concessioned to private investors. Increased direct foreign investment was achieved during 1991 and an expansion of private investment and private consumption emerged as the economy recovered and GDP grew in 1991. Our measurement for inequality shows a reduction in 1991 and stabilization in 1992, though at very high levels. There followed an economic recovery: in 1994 Peru registered the highest GDP growth of all Latin America reaching 12.7 percent, mostly fueled by the expansion of exports and private investment. We observe an increase in inequality for 1993, followed by a slight reduction in 1994, echoing the behavior of GDP growth. Table 2>   Table 2 presents correlation coefficients relating the percentage change in inequality to the growth rate of real GDP/capita for each country through time, 1970 to 1995. The correlations are invariably negative, and though in certain individual cases they are weak, in others and notably Argentina, Colombia and Peru they are quite strong. Taken together they tend to support the hypothesis of a Kuznets relationship between GDP levels and inequality in Latin America in the short run: strong progress toward higher GDP reduces inequality, and vice versa. They are consistent with the intution of our earlier paper, namely that when GDP growth exceeds population growth, inequality declines, and conversely. Still, a full analysis of the economic determinants of changing inequality for Latin America lies well beyond the scope of this paper.
Yet we do believe it is useful to attempt a general evaluation of the performance of Latin American governments during the quarter century for which we have data. Our motivation in this instance is not econometric; we have only our own perceptions of history and our reading of the graphical relationship between inequality, growth and regime change with which to justify the exercise. Still, we believe that fair-minded and knowledgeable observers of Latin American history will agree: there is a striking tendency for inequality to rise during orthodox and liberalizing governments, particularly military regimes, and for inequality to decline, at least briefly, under populist, protectionist, and heterodox regimes.
On the assumption that economic growth and increasing equity are both socially desirable goals, an interesting question can be posed. Which governments during this tumultuous period best achieved both goals in tandem? Which government performed worst on both criteria? And are there governments that succeeded in producing growth without equity, or equity without growth?
We used the data reported in Figure 1 to provide an answer in the following highly simplified way. For each year in which GDP growth is positive and inequality falls, we assigned a positive point. For each year in which inequality rose and GDP fell, we assigned a negative point. Growth with rising inequality and recession with declining inequality were each assigned a score of zero.
Then we divided the sum of the points obtained by the number of years each regime was in power.
This produces an grading index that can vary from -1 to 1. Table 3 Obviously, this analysis is severely limited in important respects. We do not allow for the vagaries of external events over which Latin governments had no control, such as the oil shocks. And we do not address the intertemporal sustainability of regimes of different kinds, a critical question.
Obviously, some populist policies were reversed because of untenable declines on the external account (Echeverria) or a failure to cope with wage pressures leading to inflation (Garcia). In other cases, internal and external resistance led to the violent termination of populist experiments, notably in Chile. It would be foolhardy to cite the evidence offered here in support of the case that certain policies "work" while others "fail." Nevertheless, we believe that a broader lesson does emerge, in a tentative way, from this evidence and analysis. It is that for much of the period under examination, the political coloration of the government did affect the short-run performance of the economy. Populist governments could set out to achieve reductions in inequality and could achieve them, while military governments with the opposite objectives similarly achieved their goals. Policies did matter. This conclusion is perhaps likely to be surprising only to economists, and of a certain stripe. And it may not continue to hold in the Latin America of today, characterized by highly open economies and weak democracies with few of the economic powers of twenty years ago. But we believe it is a useful reminder of how things once were, and in the not-so-distant past. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Theil' Index base=1970 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Theil' Index bse=1970 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Theil'Index base=1970 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1992 1994 1996 Thiel' Index base-1970 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Theil' Index base=1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Theil'Index base=1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Theil'Index base=1970 
